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An Examination of the Application
of Common Carrier Regulation
to Entities Providing New
Telecommunications
Services
Kaye L. O'Riordan*
Federal regulation of modern telecommunications services has thusfarproceeded
under the judicial analyses developed to deal with communications services which
existed when the Communications Act of 1934 was enacted Economies of scale
dictated that those earl, communications services be operated in a way that left no
roomfor the market competition which would otherwise/unction to keep rates low
and eliminate discrimination in rates among classes of customers, go vernmental reg-
ulation was thus deemed necessary as a substitutefor marketforces. In this article,
the authorpoints out that, with the development of new types of telecommunications
entities, this presumption does not automatically carry over to the present. She ex-
amines instances where the Federal Communications Commission and the courts
have attempted to apply existing analyses to new telecommunications entities and
services, andfnds them to be inconsistent and inadequate to fuill the purposes in-
tended to be achieved by governmental regulation. In light of these dficiencies, she
discusses the criteria that are pertinent to a proper consideration of whether a mod-
ern telecommunications entity should be regulated and the potential effectiveness of
the proposed amendments to the common carrier portions of the Communications
Act.
INTRODUCTION
T HE PORTIONS OF the Communications Act of 1934' that to-day regulate communications common carriage were taken
largely from the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887.2 The tele-
* B.A. (1970), J.D. (1973), University of Arizona. The author is currently associated
with the firm of Elam, Burke, Jeppesen, Evans and Boyd in Boise, Idaho. Most of the
preparation of this article was done while Ms. O'Riordan was an Assistant Professor of
Law at Catholic University of America Law School.
1. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified at 47 U.S.C.
§§ 151-609 (1976)).
2. Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (codified in scattered sec-
tions of 49 U.S.C.). The Communications Act combined the regulation of rates, which had
been begun by the Federal Radio Commission (FRC) pursuant to the Radio Act of 1927,
ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (repealed by Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 602(a), 48 Stat.
1102), and the regulation of communications common carriers, which had been rather spo-
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phone and telegraph industries were analogized to the railroad
and trucking industries, and the same justifications made for regu-
lation of the latter were made for regulation of communications
services. They were regarded as natural monopolies since, due to
economies of scale, the size at which the services were most effi-
cient left no room for competition. Without competitors to per-
form the market functions of keeping rates low and eliminating
discrimination in rates among classes of customers, it was felt that
the government should step in to provide comprehensive regula-
tion over market entry, rates, and terms and conditions of service.
The purpose of the Act was, therefore, to ensure that communica-
tions common carriers furnish communications services to the
public upon reasonable request and at just and reasonable rates.3
The Act vested this regulatory function in the Federal Com-
munications Commission (FCC).4 The FCC's powers are exten-
sive. It supervises the imposition of charges by the carriers5 and
may itself prescribe just and reasonable charges.6 It investigates
complaints concerning acts or omissions of the carriers.7 It must
approve the construction or extension of new lines and approve
the discontinuance of service.8 It may even go so far as to make a
valuation of the property owned or used by the carrier;9 examine
any transactions entered into by the carrier that relate to the fur-
nishing of equipment, services, supplies, or personnel to the car-
radically begun by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) pursuant to an amendment
to the Interstate Commerce Act. Mann-Elkins Act, ch. 309, § 7, 36 Stat. 539 (1910)
(amending Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, § 1, 24 Stat. 379) (current version at
49 U.S.C. § 1 (1976)). In 1934, when the creation of a separate commission to regulate
interstate communications was proposed to Congress, one suggested approach was to cre-
ate the new commission by a simple pro forma statement that all functions dealing with
communications then vested in both the ICC and the FRC would vest in the Federal Com-
munications Commission. H.R. REP. No. 1918, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); 78 CONG. REC.
10969 (1939). Although this approach was rejected in favor of drafting a new statute, it is
readily apparent from an examination of the statute and the analysis provided by Congress
that little more was done than amalgamate the applicable portions of the two statutes.
3. Communications Act § 201(a), 47 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1976) provides: "It shall be the
duty of every common carrier engaged in interstate or foreign communication by wire or
radio to furnish such communication service upon reasonable request .... " Subsection
(b) provides: "All charges, practices, classifications, and regulations for and in connection
with such communication services, shall be just and reasonable .
4. Id §§ 1, 4, 5, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 154, 155.
5. Id §§ 203, 204, 47 U.S.C. §§ 203, 204.
6. Id § 205, 47 U.S.C. § 205.
7. Id § 208, 47 U.S.C. § 208.
8. Id § 214, 47 U.S.C. § 214.
9. Id § 213, 47 U.S.C. § 213.
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rier;t0 and inquire into the management of the carrier's business,"I
with the right of access to and inspection of the carrier's records
and accounts.' 2
A major deficiency in this regulatory scheme is that it inade-
quately describes what is to be regulated. The Act defines a com-
munications common carrier as "any person engaged as a
common carrier for hire, in interstate or foreign communication
by wire or radio or in interstate or foreign radio transmission of
energy . . . ... ' The conference report which accompanied the
Act fails to clarify this circular definition. It states that the defini-
tion does not include any person who is not a "common carrier in
the ordinary sense of the term."' 4 Even the FCC itself provides
little guidance. Its regulations define a communications common
carrier simply as "any person engaged in rendering communica-
tions services for hire to the public."' 5
The inefficacy of this description is highlighted in the deci-
sional law relating to modem telecommunications services, most
of which came into existence long after 1934. In attempting to
determine which of these new communications services should be
regulated, the courts have struggled to discover what Congress
meant by subjecting to regulation only those entities that are com-
mon carriers "in the ordinary sense of the term." Courts have
construed this phrase in two different ways. Under one judicial
construction, Congress has referenced the sizable and growing
body of law dealing with the characteristics of common carriage
and has directed the FCC to this source in deciding whether to
regulate new entities and services. According to the second judi-
cial construction, Congress' simplistic definition of common carri-
ers accords the FCC broad independent discretion in deciding
whether to regulate new entities and services as they develop.
10. Id § 215, 47 U.S.C. § 215.
11. Id § 218, 47 U.S.C. § 218.
12. Id § 220(c), 47 U.S.C. § 220(c).
13. Id § 3(h), 47 U.S.C. § 153(h).
14. H.R. REP. No. 1918, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1934). This language is not in itself
very helpful and may exclude only press associations. The full statement reads:
It is to be noted that the definition does not include any person if not a common
carrier in the ordinary sense of the term, and therefore does not include press
associations or other organizations engaged in the business of collecting and dis-
tributing news services which may refuse to furnish to any person service which
they are capable of furnishing, and may furnish service under varying arrange-
ments, establishing the service to be rendered, the terms under which rendered,
and the charges therefor.
Id
15. 47 C.F.R. § 21.2 (1978).
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These two views of the congressional mandate have been used
to justify the FCC's treatment of new communications services,
but no attempt has been made to reconcile them. They are in fact
irreconcilable because they necessitate disparate degrees of in-
volvement for the FCC in the decisionmaking process. Under the
first view, the FCC has a passive role; under the second, it has an
active role. More importantly, both views often fail to take into
account the underlying purposes of regulation. If followed
blindly, either may focus the FCC's inquiry only upon whether
the entity is a common carrier and divert it from questioning
whether the entity should be regulated. Thus, once the FCC de-
termines under any rationale that a new entity is a common car-
rier, regulation automatically ensues, even if there is no need for
it. More appropriately, the FCC's evaluation should encompass
an economic analysis of the new entity's activities. Once the FCC
determines that a particular communications service is not vulner-
able to monopolistic practices, regulation need not ensue, even if
the entity is a common carrier "in the ordinary sense of the term."
This article analyzes instances where the FCC and the courts
have attempted to apply the congressionally mandated standard
for regulating common carriers to new telecommunications enti-
ties and services. The inconsistent results they have produced
demonstrate that they have lost sight of the purposes to be
achieved by regulation. Accordingly, this article discusses the cri-
teria that are pertinent to a proper consideration of whether an
entity should be regulated. Finally, this article examines the pro-
posed revision of the Communications Act and concludes that it
offers the FCC a clearer, more pragmatic mandate for regulation.
I. THE Two EXISTING STANDARDS
A. The First Application of a Standard by the FCC:
Frontier Broadcasting Co. v. Collier
The first major case in which the FCC determined whether a
new service constituted common carriage was Frontier Broadcast-
ing Co. v. Collier.6 In that case, the FCC formulated what is re-
garded as the seminal definition of "common carrier," used by the
FCC in many of its later decisions. 7
In Frontier Broadcasting, several television broadcasters filed a
16. 24 F.C.C. 251 (1958).
17. E.g., In re Regulatory Policies Concerning Resale and Shared Use of Common
Carrier Servs. and Facilities, 60 F.C.C.2d 261, 304-08 (1976).
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complaint requesting that the FCC declare that Community An-
tenna Television (CATV) system operators were common carriers
and therefore subject to regulation under the Communications
Act of 1934. To support their request for regulation, the broad-
casters cited several similarities between CATV systems and the
telephone and telegraph common carriers already regulated by the
FCC. First, the broadcasters argued that CATV service was avail-
able to any member of the public willing to pay for it if the service
could feasibly be provided." Second, they pointed out that
CATV operators transmitted information by wire to the sub-
scriber.19 Finally, they noted that CATV systems were analogous
to several other services which the FCC had determined to be
common carrier services.
20
In formulating a test for determining what entities are com-
mon carriers, the FCC first looked to the definition of common
carrier found in section 3(h) of the Communications Act.21 In
principal part, this definition states that a common carrier is any
person engaged as a common carrier for hire.22 Finding this defi-
nition wanting, the FCC then referenced the Communications
Act's legislative history in which Congress declared that the Act's
regulatory provisions should not apply to persons who are not
common carriers "in the ordinary sense of the term. ' 23 The FCC
construed this language as a mandate from Congress to regulate
only those entities having the traditional characteristics of a com-
24
mon carrier.
The FCC then examined the characteristics of CATV service.
It acknowledged that CATV systems were similar to telephone
and telegraph common carriers in several respects.2 5 Neverthe-
18. 24 F.C.C. at 252.
19. Id.
20. These included baseball-sports services furnished by Western Union and program
reception services. Id at 252-53.
21. 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1976).
22. The definition in its entirety reads:
"Common carrier" or "carrier" means any person engaged as a common carrier
for hire, in interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio or interstate or
foreign radio transmission of energy, except where reference is made to common
carriers not subject to this chapter, but a person engaged in radio broadcasting
shall not, insofar as such person is so engaged, be deemed a common carrier.
Id.
23. H.R. REP. No. 1918, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1934).
24. 24 F.C.C. at 254.
25. The principal similarity was that both offered "to transmit, by wire, intelligence in
the form of television broadcast signals, to any member of the public who desire[d] to
subscribe to the service." Id
19791
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less, it noted an important difference: the content of the informa-
tion transmitted by the CATV system was determined by the
system operator and not by the subscriber.26 This observation
sparked the formulation of a working definition of a communica-
tions common carrier:
Fundamental to the concept of a communications common car-
rier is that such a carrier holds itself out or makes a public of-
fering to provide facilities by wire or radio whereby all
members of the public who chose (sic) to employ such facilities
and to compensate the carrier therefor may communicate or
transmit intelligence of their own design and choosing between
points on the system of that carrier and other carriers connect-
ing with it.
27
This definition has been applied by the FCC and the courts to
other communications entities to determine if they are common
carriers.21 While the FCC's definition distinguished the tradi-
tional common carriers from CATV systems in the fact situation
presented by Frontier Broadcasting, it cannot be consistently ap-
plied to other fact patterns. For example, land-mobile radio com-
munications systems transmit intelligence formulated by the
subscriber and therefore fit the Frontier Broadcasting definition;
yet the FCC has chosen not to regulate them as common carri-
ers.
2 9
A principal shortcoming of the FCC's analysis in Frontier
Broadcasting is that it only compared the attributes of the com-
munications system at issue with the model entity it believed Con-
gress intended to be regulated. The FCC failed to consider
economic or policy arguments going to the issue of whether regu-
lation per se is desirable, considerations which should underlie
any decision to regulate or not to regulate.
B. The Discretion Standard. Philadelphia Television
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC
A completely different formulation of the FCC's role was de-
veloped by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
26. Id at 254-55.
27. Id at 254 (footnote omitted). A shortcoming of this definition has been pointed
out in later FCC decisions. The definition implies that the subscriber is actually transmit-
ting the information rather than the carrier providing the means of transmission. See, e.g.,
In re Regulatory Policies Concerning Resale and Shared Use of Common Carrier Servs.
and Facilities, 60 F.C.C.2d 261, 270 (1976).
28. See note 17 supra.
29. See text accompanying notes 62-72 infra.
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cuit in Philadelphia Television Broadcasting Co. v. FCC.3" This
case involved an appeal from the FCC's summary dismissal of
another complaint from broadcasters that also sought to regulate
CATV systems as common carriers.3 ' Instead of reviewing the
FCC's determination, the court deferred to the FCC's determina-
tion of that issue. The court stated that Congress, by defining
common carrier in general terms and failing to provide any help-
ful legislative history, had left the decision to regulate to the dis-
cretion of the FCC.32
In a statutory scheme in which Congress has given an agency
various bases of jurisdiction and various tools with which to
protect the public interest, the agency is entitled to some leeway
in choosing which jurisdictional base and which regulatory
tools will be most effective in advancing the Congressional ob-
jective.33
The court held that as long as the FCC made a rational choice, a
reviewing court could not disturb the result.3
4
The discretionary standard was also applied by the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in response to a challenge by the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) to the FCC's cable tele-
vision access rules.35 These rules required the operators of the
larger cable systems to provide nondiscriminatory access channels
to the public for educational, local government, and entertain-
ment uses.36 The ACLU contended that common carrier regula-
tion should also be imposed upon cable operators to ensure
nondiscriminatory access for all persons desiring to use the access
channels.37 The court held that the FCC did not have to regulate
access channels as a form of common carriage. 38 Although the
court acknowledged that "from a technological point of view" ac-
30. 359 F.2d 282 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
31. Id at 283. Specifically, the complainants sought to bar Rollins Broadcasting, Inc.
from constructing and operating a CATV system until it complied with the common carrier
regulations.
32. Id at 284.
33. I.d
34. Id The access Channel rules were overturned as going beyond the ancillary to
broadcasting test in Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1978). For a
discussion of this test see note 43 infra and accompanying text.
35. ACLU v. FCC, 523 F.2d 1344 (9th Cir. 1975). The access channel rules were
overturned as going beyond the ancillary to broadcasting test in Midwest Video Corp. v.
FCC, 571 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1978). For a discussion of this test see note 43 infra and
accompanying test.
36. Id at 1348-49.
37. Id at 1349-50.
38. Id at 1351.
19791
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cess channels could function as common carriers, citing the defini-
tion of common carrier in Frontier Broadcasting39 it decided that
the FCC could exercise discretion in determining the regulatory
standards to be applied to cable operations since it had the techni-
cal expertise to deal with new and experimental areas.4"
Although the court in A CL U v. FCC based its holding on the
Supreme Court decisions in United States v. Southwestern Cable
Co.4 and United States v. Midwest Video Corp.,42 in which the
Court established a basis for FCC regulation of CATV systems
independent of the "common carrier" test,43 it found Frontier
Broadcasting and Philadelphia Television to be "historically in-
structive."'  If by this the couft simply meant that the ultimate
holdings in those latter two cases-which said CATV systems
were not common carriers-influenced its own similar holding,
reference to them is acceptable. But if the court cited them for the
analyses by which they reached their holdings, then there is cause
for objection. Applying expertise and exercising discretion in de-
ciding whether to regulate an entity are activities altogether differ-
ent from matching the characteristics of CATV systems with those
of a conceptual entity supposedly envisioned by Congress.
In any event, either line of analysis is an undesirable means of
determining the proper scope of regulation of new communica-
tions entities. Trying to distill a congressional standard from the
Communications Act and its legislative history and leaving a deci-
sion whether to regulate solely to the FCC's discretion are inap-
propriate coefficients of a regulatory decisionmaking process.
Moreover, the availability of either line of analysis can only lead
to uncertainty or, possibly, a convenient rationale for a result-ori-
ented agency to justify a decision. The inadequacy of both of
these analyses becomes apparent from a consideration of past
FCC evaluations of new communications entities.
39. Id at 1350 & n.9.
40. Id at 1350-51.
41. 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
42. 406 U.S. 649 (1972).
43. Under the standard developed in Southwestern Cable and Midwest Video, known
as the "reasonably ancillary standard," the FCC may regulate CATV under sections 2(a)
and 303(r) of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 152(a), 303(r) (1976), so long
as the regulation is "reasonably ancillary to the Commission's various responsibilities for
the regulation of television broadcasting." See United States v. Southwestern Cable Co.,
392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968); United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 659-63
(1972).
44. ACLU v. FCC, 523 F.2d 1344, 1351 (9th Cir. 1975).
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II. THE FCC, COMMON CARRIER REGULATION, AND NEW
COMMUNICATIONS ENTITIES: A NEED FOR ONE
RATIONALE
In the twenty years since the question of regulating CATV sys-
tems first arose, the FCC has had to confront similar questions
with respect to other technological advances in the communica-
tions field. This section discusses how the FCC and the courts
have dealt with developments in three major areas: the data
processing industry, land-mobile radio services, and the resale and
sharing of private line services. While in most cases the FCC and
the courts have employed either a Frontier Broadcasting or a Phil-
adelphia Television analysis, in rare instances they have also con-
sidered what should be the paramount issue in any case: whether
regulation is necessary in light of its purposes.
A. The Data Processing Industry-4 Consideration of a Need
for Regulation
During the 1960's, computer development became dependent
upon communications common carrier facilities and services.
Owners and manufacturers began to offer computer access to the
public on a time-sharing or batch-processing basis and to main-
tain computer service bureaus or information services. To facili-
tate the availability of computers to the general public, the owners
and manufacturers utilized communications channels obtained
largely from communications common carriers. Furthermore, the
carriers themselves began to use computers not only to perform
message and circuit-switching functions, but also to store, process,
and retrieve management or business data for anyone desiring to
subscribe to this service. In 1966, faced with the regulatory and
policy questions presented by the growing convergence and inter-
dependence of communications and data processing technologies,
the FCC initiated an inquiry into the computer industry to deter-
mine if any of its services should be subject to regulation pursuant
to the Communications Act.45
In its tentative decision, issued in 1970,46 the FCC set out to
answer several basic regulatory and policy questions including the
45. In re Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Com-
puter and Communication Servs. and Facilities, 7 F.C.C.2d 11 (1966) (notice of inquiry).
46. In re Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Com-
puter and Communication Servs. and Facilities, 28 F.C.C.2d 291 (1970) (tentative decision
of the Commission).
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two discussed herein:4 7 (1) what the nature and extent of the regu-
latory jurisdiction in the data processing area should be and (2)
whether and to what extent common carriers should be permitted
to engage in data processing.48 After noting that it possessed the
power to regulate communications services which did not exist at
the time of the enactment of the Communications Act,4 9 the FCC
indicated that in the instant case it would utilize the discretionary
standard of Philadelphia Television, rather than the Frontier
Broadcasting modeling analysis, in exercising its regulatory pow-
ers.
50
The FCC then articulated certain standards which would
guide its exercise of discretion. It looked to what it termed "the
basic purpose of regulatory activity in the context of our general
national policy."' 5' This national policy was rooted in the free en-
terprise system which encouraged "individual initiative to enter
into any given enterprise and compete for the available busi-
ness."5 2 The system would tolerate governmental regulation only
to the extent necessary to prevent restraint of trade.53
Government intervention and regulation are limited to those
areas where there is a natural monopoly, where economies of
scale are of such magnitude as to dictate the need for a regu-
lated monopoly, or where such other factors are present to re-
quire governmental intervention to protect the public interest
47. Many other issues were considered by the FCC, such as the dividing line between
data processing and communications and the establishment of maximum separation re-
quirements. For discussion of these issues see, for example, Berman, Computer or Commu-
nications? Allocation of Functions and the Role ofthe Federal Communications Commission,
27 FED. CoM. B.J. 161 (1974); Note, The FCC Computer Inquiry" Interfaces of Competitive
and Regulated Markets, 71 MICH. L. REV. 172 (1972); Note, Computer Services and the
Federal Regulation of Communications, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 328 (1967).
48. In re Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Com-
puter and Communication Servs. and Facilities, 28 F.C.C.2d 291, 295 (1970) (tentative
decision of the Commission).
49. Id at 297.
50. The agency stated that:
[W]e are not required to assert and exercise . . . jurisdiction merely because we
might construe the activity as one which could be encompassed within the intent
of the Communications Act of 1934. Instead, as the court in Philadelphia [ Televi-
sion] noted, as the expert agency we are "entitled to latitude in coping with new
developments" in the dynamic field of communications. Consequently, we are
"entitled to some leeway in choosing which jurisdictional base and which regula-
tory tools will be most effective in advancing the congressional objective"--the
protection of the public interest.
Id
51. Id
52. Id
53. Id
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because a potential for unfair practices exists.54
Applying these considerations to the data processing industry,
the FCC found that competition in the field was "active and grow-
ing," with "no. .. barriers to free entry into the market. ' 55 Find-
ing there to be an "effective competitive situation," the FCC
concluded that regulation was unnecessary.56
The FCC invited and received written comments to its tenta-
tive decision from interested parties. In 1971, it released its final
decision,57 which adopted the tentative decision's reasoning, as
well as its conclusion that the data processing industry should not
be regulated. The FCC thus began to formulate, within the con-
text of a Philadelphia Television discretionary standard, an analy-
sis which takes into account the economic realities so fundamental
to a decision whether to regulate new communications entities.
The limitations of this analysis, however, are obvious: it was for-
mulated by the FCC and not by Congress, and is therefore vulner-
able to modification by the courts and the FCC itself.
54. Id
55. Id
56. Id at 298.
We expect the competitive environment within which data processing services
are now being offered to result in substantial public benefit by making available
to the public, at reasonable charges, a wider range of existing and new data
processing services. We believe that these expectations will continue to be real-
ized in the free give-and-take of the market place without the need for and possi-
ble burden of rules, regulations and licensing requirements.
Id. The FCC indicated, however, that it would reexamine the regulatory questions and
policies if there were significant changes in the data processing industry or if abuses oc-
curred. Id
57. In re Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Com-
puter and Communication Servs. and Facilities, 28 F.C.C.2d 267 (1971) (final decision and
order), afdin part and rev'd in part sub nom. GTE Service Corp. v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724 (2d
Cir. 1973).
58. In its final decision, the FCC repeated its finding that an analysis of the activities
of the computer industry revealed that regulation would serve no purpose at the industry's
current state of development:
[I]n view of our expectation that the competition afforded by carriers in the provi-
sion of computer services could and would provide benefits in such matters as
new and improved services and lower prices, we cannot find the necessary social,
economic or policy considerations which would require or even justify an outright
prohibition against the furnishing of data processing services by common carriers.
Id. at 270. But the FCC also reiterated its "intention to reconsider this conclusion should
future experience indicate that any of the premises underlying this conclusion have not
materialized or that in spite of our prescribed safeguards carrier abuses are developing."
Id
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B. Land-Mobile Radio Services-A Common Law Modelfor
Common Carrier Status
In National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners
(NARUC) v. FCC,59 the District of Columbia Circuit rejected the
notion that the FCC could exercise discretion in determining
whether a communications entity is a common carrier. Instead,
the court said that the FCC must use only the common law defini-
tion of common carrier in its deliberations.6" This decision, in ef-
fect, limits the FCC to a modeling analysis similar to the one it
propounded in Frontier Broadcasting.
NARUC involved developments in land-mobile radio serv-
ices.6" In order to meet the growing requirements of land-mobile
services, the FCC in 1970 made additional spectrum space avail-
able for land-mobile systems.62 At the same time, the FCC asked
interested parties to submit proposals suggesting how the 30
megahertz of this space which was allocated to the dispatch-type
land-mobile radio systems63 could be most effectively used.
59. 525 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
60. Id at 644.
61. Land-mobile radio service is radio communication between land-based transmit-
ting stations and land-mobile transmitting stations or exclusively between land-mobile
transmitting stations. A land-based station is stationary and is not intended for operation
while in motion, e.g., a police dispatcher's transmitter. A land-mobile station is intended
for operation during movement on the land surface, e.g., a transmitter carried in police
vehicles. See 47 C.F.R. § 21.2 (1976).
62. First Report and Order and Second Notice of Inquiry, Land Mobile Radio Servs.,
35 F.C.C. 644, 645 (1970).
63. Land-mobile radio technology has been utilized mainly in two areas. One is the
provision of mobile telephone service for automobiles, which is interconnected with the
wired telephone network. The other is the provision of dispatch services in which the radio
communications services are used to control the movements of a fleet of vehicles. Different
systems of governmental regulation have developed in these two areas.
Mobile telephone service is provided by several small, competitive "radio common car-
riers," and, increasingly, by American Telephone and Telegraph Company, which has pro-
posed a high capacity and highly sophisticated cellular radio communications system.
These public entities are regulated as common carriers under title II of the Communica-
tions Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-23 (1976), and, since the service involves the use of radio,
under title III, 47 U.S.C. §§ 301-99 (1976), as part of the domestic public radio service.
The dispatch systems developed as private systems built for and operated by private
users. These systems were not regulated by the FCC until 1949, when the FCC established
the Public Safety, Industrial, and Land Transportation Radio Services (PSILTRS) and the
Domestic Public Radio Services. A portion of the radio frequency spectrum was allotted to
each. General Mobile Radio Service, 13 F.C.C. 1190 (1949). In establishing the PSILTRS,
the FCC General Mobile decision recognized that certain activities of local government,
such as police and fire protection, and certain activities of industrial and transportation
enterprises, such as railroad and electric utility services, had unique needs and methods of
operation. Each was allowed a "block" of frequencies for the exclusive use of its constitu-
ents. Prospective users file license applications which are quickly granted if there are suffi-
[Vol. 29:577
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After receiving and studying comments, the FCC proposed the
creation of a specialized mobile radio system (SMRS) category.
Under this category, the FCC would license persons in a new cate-
gory of entrepreneurial mobile operators who would share access
to the allocated spectrum with private operators eligible under the
Public Safety, Industrial, and Land Transportation Radio Services
(PSILTRS); unlike PSILTRS licensees, who provide services for
themselves or members of their own private cooperatives, SMRS
licensees would provide profit-motivated services for third par-
ties.' The FCC hoped that this proposal would facilitate the de-
velopment of more efficient systems to make better use of the
frequencies allocated to dispatch-type mobile radio services.65
The large capital investments needed to develop new forms of
technology to create more efficient uses of the limited frequencies
available would more feasibly be supplied by these entrepreneurs
since they would be building systems to serve many individual
users. Free competition among various SMRS and with shared
use systems would also stimulate innovation in the development
of new technology.66
By authorizing SMRS to operate like PSILTRS the FCC
chose not to regulate them as common carriers. The FCC recog-
nized that SMRS were similar to, if not technologically identical
to, radio common carriers.67 In its earlier order, it also stated that
SMRS could be regulated as common carriers under the Frontier
cient frequencies available. No hearings are necessary, so there is no "regulatory"
limitation on the entry of authorized users other than the availability of frequencies.
The regulatory scheme for the PSILTRS facilitated the rapid growth of radio commu-
nications and made land-mobile communications systems indispensable in many fields.
See Land Mobile Use of UHF TV Channels 14 through 20, 23 F.C.C.2d 325, 329-38
(1970). This rapid growth resulted in a greater than anticipated demand in the 30
megahertz (MHz) of radio spectrum alloted to the dispatch-type land-mobile radio sys-
tems.
In 1968, the FCC issued a Notice of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Land
Mobile Use of 806-960 MHz Band, 14 F.C.C.2d 311 (1968), regarding use of certain addi-
tional frequencies in land-mobile service.
64. See In re an Inquiry Relative to the Future Use of the Frequency Band 806-960
MHz, and Amendment of Parts 2, 18, 21, 73, 74, 89, 91, and 93 of the Rules Relative to
Operations in the Land Mobile Serv. Between 806-960 MHz, 51 F.C.C.2d 945, 947 n.9
(1975) (memorandum opinion and order); In re an Inquiry Relative to the Future Use of
the Frequency Band 806-960 MHz, and Amendment of Parts 2, 18, 21, 73, 74, 89, 91, and
93 of the Rules Relative to Operations in the Land Mobile Serv. Between 806 and 960
MHz, 46 F.C.C.2d 752, 762-63 (1974) (second report and order). For a discussion of the
establishment and early regulation of PSILTRS, see note 63, supra.
65. 46 F.C.C.2d at 752; 51 F.C.C.2d at 956.
66. 51 F.C.C.2d at 966-70.
67. Id at 959.
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Broadcasting test, but that it found application of that standard
irrelevant.6" The FCC stated:
[W]e have concluded that we do have the necessary statutory
authority to choose one regulatory process which is preferable,
on demonstrable grounds, over another which is not at all
suited to the objectives of the action we propose to take ...
[W]e do not think we are restricted or limited. . . in carrying
out our duties and responsibilities under the Act of assuring the
most effective and efficient use of the radio spectrum under
whatever controlling circumstances exist. We believe, rather,
that the Communications Act, read as a whole, directs us to
regulate the use of radio frequencies that are available in the
way that affords maximum benefits to the public ....
Further, we are convinced that we. . . must not carry for-
ward to the 900 MHz band the burdens and delays inherent in
present procedures, used in regulating common carriers ....
It is our view that it is very much in the public interest to shed
this heavy cloak and exchange it for one with far greater flex-
ibility and far greater promise for maximizing the potential of
utilization of the radio spectrum at 900 MHz.69
By regulating SMRS like PSILTRS instead of as common car-
riers, the FCC hoped to create a simplified regulatory process with
as little burden on the applicants and cost to the public as possi-
ble. It felt that competition could accomplish the objectives of
regulation. An open marketplace would foster the development of
SMRS to meet the needs and requirements of users and stimulate
the improvement of service quality and the development of new
techniques.70 It would also result in lower systems costs since ac-
tive production would discourage standardization of systems, and
a user would be able to negotiate and avoid paying for unneeded
equipment.7 Competition would provide flexibility for shaping
the use of the new spectrum the FCC had allocated. In short, the
FCC believed that the spur of competitive forces was necessary
and was more feasible and appropriate than the restraint of regu-
lation.72
68. 46 F.C.C.2d at 763.
69. Id at 764, 766. In its later order, the FCC attempted to qualify this broad asser-
tion of authority by acknowledging that if SMRS were clearly common carriers in the
ordinary sense of the term within the meaning of section 3(h) of the Communications Act,
the FCC would have to regulate them as common carriers. 51 F.C.C.2d at 959.
70. Id at 969-70.
71. Id at 970.
72. The FCC did note that "in major respects, our plan is not entirely new or untried;
rather, it arises out of and amplifies and builds on what we have found to be an effective
and efficient method of management of the radio spectrum." 46 F.C.C.2d at 762.
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The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit af-
firmed the FCC's decision that SMRS should not be regulated as
common carriers.73 But the court rejected the argument that the
FCC had discretion to decide how to regulate entities providing
telecommunications services. Instead, it developed a standard
which it felt Congress had mandated. NARUC thus limits the
broad authority that Philadelhia Television gave the FCC and
represents a return to the narrow role that the FCC imposed upon
itself in Frontier Broadcasting.
As the FCC had done in Frontier Broadcasting, the court at-
tempted to develop a definition of a common carrier that could be
matched against SMRS. This time, however, the court looked to
common law definitions of common carrier as a guide. Critical to
the definition of a common carrier under the common law was a
finding of the "quasi-public character of the activity involved."74
A private entity can acquire this quasi-public character by holding
itself out as offering a service to the public. The court observed
that it was not enough that the entity offer its services for a profit
since this would include within the concept private contract carri-
ers, which traditionally had been excluded.75 Nor was it necessary
that the entity offer its services to the entire public. 76 What was
essential to the quasi-public character of the common law concept
was that the carrier "undertakes to carry for all people indiffer-
ently.1 77
In determining whether SMRS would serve the public indis-
criminately, the court made two inquiries. First, it looked to see if
there were any "legal compulsion" for SMRS to serve indiffer-
ently.78 The court examined the proposed regulations and the ad-
ministrative scheme for SMRS and could not find any such
compulsion.79 Second, it considered whether there were "reasons
73. National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs. v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir.
1976).
74. Id at 641.
75. Id.
76. Id
One may be a common carrier though the nature of the service rendered is
sufficiently specialized as to be of possible use only to a fraction of the total popu-
lation. And business may be turned away either because it is not of the type
normally accepted or because the carrier's capacity has been exhausted.
Id.
77. Id "But a carrier will not be a common carrier where its practice is to make
individualized decisions, in particular cases, whether and on what terms to deal." Id
78. 525 F.2d at 642.
79. Id at 642-43. The weakness of this test is obvious since it puts the decision
squarely within the control of the agency. See National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs
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implicit in the nature of SMRS operations to expect an indifferent
holding out to the eligible user public," even in the absence of a
regulatory compulsion to do so."° Stressing that the inquiry was
speculative, since there were no SMRS in existence, the court hy-
pothesized how they would operate. It envisioned SMRS serving
a stable clientele, with only a minor turnover of customers, and
providing highly individualized operations.8 This led the court to
conclude that SMRS probably would not offer their services to the
public at all, and consequently, it was not necessary to regulate
them as common carriers.12
Thus, the court affirmed the FCC's decision not to impose
common carrier regulation. But the court made it clear that it dis-
approved of the rationale for the FCC's decision:
[W]e reject those parts of the Orders which imply an unfettered
discretion in the Commission to confer or not confer common
carrier status on a given entity, depending upon the regulatory
goals it seeks to achieve. The common law definition of common
carrier is sufficiently definite as not to admit of agency discretion
in the classification of operating communications entities ....
Thus, we affirm the Commission's clarification not because it
has any significant discretion in determining who is a common
carrier, but because we find nothing in the record or the com-
mon carrier definition to cast doubt on its conclusions that
SMRS are not common carriers.83
The use of the common law standard for imposing common
carrier regulation has several drawbacks. First, it allows no defer-
ence to the special expertise of the FCC in an extremely technical
area. It precludes the FCC from considering attributes of new
telecommunications services or changes in the telecommunica-
tions services market. The NARUC court refused to examine the
validity of any of the pragmatic considerations developed by the
FCC to justify its decision not to regulate SMRS. s4 Most impor-
tantly, this common law standard forecloses consideration of the
role played by competition. The court did not examine the allega-
tions of parties, such as the radio common carriers, that the ap-
proach taken by the FCC generated unequal competition between
v. FCC, 533 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (where the lower court's application of this test to
two-way applications of cable television is rejected).
80. 525 F.2d at 642.
81. d. at 643.
82. Id
83. Id at 644 (emphasis added and footnotes omitted).
84. See notes 64-72 supra and accompanying text.
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regulated and unregulated entities.85 Any decision to impose or
stay common carrier regulation should include these considera-
tions; mere reference to a common law analogue makes little use
of the FCC's expertise.
A second problem is presented by the court's analogy from
FCC treatment of "public correspondence" 8 6 and "private line
service"" in the telecommunications field to those of common
carrier and non-common carrier operators in the transportation
field to support the requirement that a common carrier hold out
its services indifferently. An essential element of public corre-
spondence, the court said, was that it was at the disposal of the
public, while a private line service was set aside only for particular
customers and was not generally available to the public.88 The
court observed that "[t]his public-private dichotomy is generally
regarded as synonymous with the distinction between common
carrier and non-common carrier operators."8 9 The FCC, how-
ever, has actually regulated both public correspondence and pri-
vate line service as common carrier activities.90
Another problem with the decision is that the court stated that
it is free to challenge the present characterization of SMRS should
their operations actually involve an indiscriminate offering of
service to the public.9 This statement interjects uncertainty into
the new SMRS marketplace which could inhibit the interest of
potential entrants.
A final problem with the common law standard is that the
FCC might only apply it obligatorily to support a desired result.
The actual result could well be based on the economic conditions
in the given market, the nature of the new services, or other fac-
tors that the FCC considered to be controlling. But as long as the
FCC could justify a decision to regulate or not to regulate by
showing that it had applied the common law standard, it would
not need to discuss these controlling factors.
85. 51 F.C.C.2d at 922.
86. See 47 C.F.R. § 21.2 (1978).
87. See id.
88. 525 F.2d at 642.
89. Id
90. Specialized Common Carrier Decision, 29 F.C.C.2d 870, relL denied, 31 F.C.C.2d
1106, af§dsub nom., Washington Util. & Transp. Comm. v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 836 (1976); In re Applications of Microwave Comms., Inc., 15
F.C.C.2d 953 (1969), recon. denied, 21 F.C.C.2d 90, mod granted, 27 F.C.C.2d 380 (1971).
91. 525 F.2d at 644.
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C. Resale and Sharing Activities. Shortcomings of the Common
Law Model
A new service for which the FCC considered common carrier
regulation was the resale and sharing of private line services.92
Resale and sharing of private line services93 had been controlled
(and in large part prohibited) by the common carriers them-
selves. 94 But the FCC declared such restrictions unlawful and dis-
criminatory, thereby ratifying the creation of a new class of
entities which would lease facilities from the underlying common
carriers and sell services to the public.95 The FCC decided to reg-
ulate only resellers, not those engaged in sharing arrangements, as
common carriers.96
In reaching its decision to regulate only resellers as common
carriers, the FCC began with the definition of communications
92. In re Regulatory Policies Concerning Resale and Shared Use of Common Carrier
Servs. and Facilities, 60 F.C.C.2d 261 (1976), modified 60 F.C.C.2d 588, 61 F.C.C.2d 70,
amended upon reconsideration, 62 F.C.C.2d 588 (1977), aff'd sub nom. American Tel. and
Tel. Co. v. FCC, 572 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1978) (the Resale decision). For discussion of the
issues raised before the FCC, see Note, Resale and Sharing of Private Line Communications
Services- A.T&T Restriction and FCC Regulation, 61 U. VA. L. REV. 679 (1975).
93. Private line service is an alternative to long distance telephone service. It makes
telecommunications facilities between two points available to large volume users on a full-
time basis and for a flat rate. Substantial discounts have been given to customers purchas-
ing private line services in bulk. Because the services are often underutilized, there is a
desire among small users to share the services and among middlemen to buy the dis-
counted bulk services and then sell them to small customers at less than long distance rates.
The FCC defined sharing as "a non-profit arrangement in which several users collec-
tively use communications services and facilities provided by a carrier, with each user pay-
ing the communications related costs associated therewith according to its pro rata usage
. .. 60 F.C.C.2d at 263. Resale was defined as "an activity wherein one entity sub-
scribes to the communications services and facilities of another entity and then reoffers
communications service and facilities to the public. . . for profit." Id at 271.
94. With limited exceptions, the tariffs of most telecommunications common carriers
prohibited the customers of private line services, Message Toll Services (MTS), and Wide
Area Telecommunications Services (WATS), from receiving any payment for use of the
services in transmitting any communications for others. Id at 264. The restrictions on the
resale and sharing of MTS and WATS were upheld since there was no support in the
record for overturning them. Id at 264-65.
95. Id at 280-85. Several types of entities are encompassed. The so-called value-
added carriers had been previously regulated as common carriers. These included Packet
Communications, Telenet, and Graphnet. Packet Communications, Inc., 43 F.C.C.2d 922
(1973); Graphnet Systems, Inc., 44 F.C.C.2d 800 (1974). The FCC rejected the value-ad-
ded distinction because a service is only "value-added" to the extent that the underlying
carrier does not offer that service and this changes over time. The FCC spoke instead of
the resale entities offering brokerage or processing services. 60 F.C.C. 2d at 271-72. Enti-
ties involved in sharing are, of course, primarily involved in businesses other than commu-
nications, such as airlines or stock exchanges.
96. See notes 116-25 and accompanying text infra.
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common carrier found in the Communications Act. As it had
done in Frontier Broadcasting, it discounted the statutory defini-
tion as well as the legislative history as circular and unhelpful.97
The FCC then analyzed the case law to determine the "legal char-
acteristics" of a communications common carrier, as NARUC re-
quired.98
Both Frontier Broadcasting and NAR UC involved a public of-
fering to provide communications facilities.99 Since resellers
made offerings of facilities to the public, they were likely candi-
dates for common carrier regulation. That the resellers did not
necessarily own the facilities they provided was considered insig-
nificant: "The public neither cares nor inquires whether the of-
feror owns or leases the facilities. Resellers will be offering a
communications service for hire to the public just as the tradi-
tional carriers do."' 00
The contrast between the portion of the Resale decision dis-
cussing whether resale and sharing should be allowed and the por-
tion concerning the regulation of resellers as common carriers is
striking. For instance, in determining whether to allow resale and
sharing, the FCC embarked upon a detailed analysis of the public
benefits that would accrue from those activities.' It expected
a further trend toward cost-related pricing by underlying carri-
ers; a reduction in the public resources devoted to enforcement
... ; more efficient utilization of existing communication ca-
pacity; better management of communications networks; im-
proved marketing of communications services and facilities; a
wider variety of communications offerings; and increased re-
97. 60 F.C.C.2d at 304.
98. Id
99. Id at 308.
100. Id The FCC supported this conclusion with an analogy to a more traditional
transportation carrier, a freight forwarder. Id at 305-07. Freight forwarders are the mid-
dlemen of the transportation industry. They consolidate shipments which would, by them-
selves, fill less than a railroad car, charge their customers less than the railroad's rate for
small shipments, and pay the railroad the lower, carload rate. The FCC noted that at
common law freight forwarders were considered common carriers. Id at 306. In using this
analogy, however, the FCC chose to disregard the history of Interstate Commerce Com-
mission regulation of freight forwarders. In 1887, the Interstate Commerce Act had not
included freight forwarders as common carriers. Only in 1950 was the Act amended to
include them, even though they did not control the motor vehicles performing the transpor-
tation. Act of Dec. 20, 1950, ch. 1140, § 1, 64 Stat. 1113. The FCC used the analogy
nonetheless since initially "freight carriers apparently were exempt from ICC regulation
not because they were not common carriers but because the services they provided did not
constitute 'transportation service' .. within the meaning of. . .the Act." 60 F.C.C.2d at
306.
101. Id. at 298-303.
1979]
596 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:577
search, development, and implementation of communications
technology. 102
Yet the Commission limited itself to analysis of general common
law precedents in reaching its decision to regulate resale. 0 3 The
FCC should have continued its consideration of policy and eco-
nomics into these areas as well. It is submitted that an economic
analysis of a particular communications entity is more appropriate
for effectuating the purpose of the Communications Act and is
more likely to result in the correct application of common carrier
regulation.
Pragmatic reasons for imposing common carrier regulation
were suggested to the FCC in the comments of various parties to
the Resale decision. The Office of Telecommunications Policy
(OTP) argued that only the existence of a natural monopoly justi-
fied regulation of common carriers.'0" Absent technological re-
straints, competition, together with enforcement of the antitrust
laws, would provide the needed impetus to achieve the regulatory
goals of fairness and nondiscriminatory service without imposing
the costs of regulation. Another party, Telenet Communications
Corporation, argued that a third goal of regulation is to ensure
that essential communications services are not adversely affected
by the new services. The OTP noted that this could be accom-
plished by less intrusive regulatory devices, such as maximum sep-
102. Id at 302.
103. In most of the comments filed with the FCC, it was argued that the agency's deci-
sion in In re Mackay Radio and Tel. Co., 6 F.C.C. 562 (1938), mandated the regulation of
resellers. Mackay involved the question of whether the leasing of a telegraph circuit by
one common carrier from another which enables the first carrier to provide service to a new
area without first obtaining a certificate of convenience and necessity violated section 214
of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 214 (1976). But the Office of Telecommunications
Policy (OTP) in its comments pointed out that the entities involved in Mackay were them-
selves common carriers already subject to full title II regulation. 60 F.C.C.2d at 307. Thus,
the FCC's holding in Mackay that the leasing activity necessitated a certificate under title
II did not determine the initial question of whether the communications entity would have
been considered a common carrier solely as a result of the lease.
The FCC could have used Mackay to formulate a structural analysis of the resale area.
Its decision in Mackay was not prompted by the public's perception of the service involved
and did not result from an application of communications or transportation common law
precedents. Rather, it was based upon a need for regulation. One rationale of Mackay was
that if the leasing activity were left unregulated, facilities would be needlessly duplicated. 6
F.C.C. at 573-77. This policy justification for regulation is not present in the resale area
where competition will be encouraged. But in the Resale decision the FCC noted merely
that Mackay did not technically control. 60 F.C.C.2d at 307.
104. OTP's Reply Comments at 13-16, Regulatory Policies Concerning Resale and
Shared Use of Common Carrier Servs. and Facilities, 60 F.C.C.2d 70 (1976). OTP has
become part of the National Telecommunications and Information Administration in the
Commerce Department.
COMMON CARRIER REGULATION
aration or the creation of separate subsidiaries to engage in the
nonregulated functions.° 5 The OTP also pointed out that regulat-
ing new services in order to protect already regulated services
would lead to a completely regulated marketplace, since all activi-
ties impact to a certain extent upon each other.'
0 6
In dissenting from the FCC's decision to regulate resellers,
then-Commissioner Glen 0. Robinson similarly argued that the
only justification for regulation was to control monopolistic ten-
dencies." 7 Since the new industry was to be competitive, there
was no need for regulation, and it would be nothing more than
"pointless interference" to engage in such regulation. As Com-
missioner Robinson stated, "[R]egulation is not only a tool by
which regulatory commissions protect the public against regulated
carriers; it is also a tool by which regulated carriers protect them-
selves against competition."'' 08 The issues raised by the OTP and
Commissioner Robinson are those that should have been ad-
dressed by the FCC when deciding whether to regulate the newly
created resale industry.
More importantly, the various benefits to the public from re-
sale, which were exhaustively catalogued by the FCC, will be less-
ened or even frustrated by the FCC's decision to regulate. The
FCC stated that a major benefit of allowing resale was that it
would force carriers to provide their bulk services at prices related
to costs.'0 9 The reseller could underprice the nonbulk rate service
of the carrier by subscribing to the bulk rate service as it is now
priced and then offering service to the public at a price above the
bulk rate but below the nonbulk rate. If there is no actual cost
savings in selling in bulk, the resellers providing straight broker-
age of bulk facilities would be in existence only long enough to
force the carrier's bulk rates in line with costs. But if the rate
charged for resale brokerage is determined through regulation and
not through competition, resale brokerage would not accomplish
this benefit." 10
105. Id at 16.
106. Id at 11-12.
107. 60 F.C.C.2d at 339 (Robinson, Commissioner, dissenting).
108. Id Commissioner Robinson also stated:
When I was in the Army, there used to be a saying, "If it moves, salute it; if it
doesn't move, paint it." In this branch of the government, we proceed according
to a slightly different maxim: "If it moves, regulate it; if it doesn't move, kick
it-and when it moves, regulate it."
Id.
109. Id at 298.
110. Id at 299.
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Other benefits set forth by the FCC included better manage-
ment of specialized communications networks and the develop-
ment of innovative and flexible services."' The extent to which
these benefits arise will depend upon the competitive forces in the
resale market. The stimulus to develop new management tech-
niques and services comes from a desire to stay ahead of other
firms which market the same product." 2 If such a stimulus is not
present, these benefits will not materialize.
It is clear that the important questions of the impact of com-
mon carrier regulation upon the new resale market were not fully
analyzed by the FCC. The Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit, in affirming the Resale decision, agreed in all respects with
the analysis undertaken by the FCC;' 3 the court even carried it
one step further. Citing FPC v. Texaco, Inc., "' the court rejected
the discretion argument and stated that the FCC must regulate al
entities which are common carriers.' ' This argument begs the is-
sue since the Communications Act is, as discussed above, not clear
as to how this initial determination is to be made.
A major problem with the FCC's decision is that it distin-
guished between resale, which would be subject to common car-
rier regulation, and sharing, which would not. Because a sharing
arrangement would not involve the offering of communications
services to the public, the FCC felt that it did not come within the
common law definition of common carrier.I 6 Sharing involves a
long-term arrangement between parties wishing to communicate
between two or more geographic points who collectively use com-
munications services and facilities obtained from an underlying
carrier. 7 Each user pays the communications-related costs ac-
cording to its pro rata usage. 1 8 Sharers enter such an arrange-
ment hoping to achieve gains in economy and efficiency instead of
purchasing their communications needs separately from the un-
derlying carrier. The parties to the arrangement might even de-
111. Id at 299-303.
112. Regulation of resale entities will, according to Commissioner Robinson, force
them to compete through their lawyers before the FCC rather than through their salespeo-
ple before the consumer. Id at 339 (Robinson, Commissioner, dissenting).
113. AT&T v. FCC, 572 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1978).
114. 417 U.S. 380 (1974).
115. 572 F.2d at 25-26.
116. 60 F.C.C.2d at 316-21.
117. Id at 316.
118. Id The FCC noted that it did not "rule out any other manner of allocation of the
costs of the sharing arrangement, so long as one user does not realize a profit from such
allocation (other than the reduction of its own communications costs)." Id at n.96.
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cide that they can make more efficient use of the leased
communications facilities if they hire a network control manager.
The costs of this service are also apportioned among the parties.
So long as users make no profit from the arrangement and, more
importantly, no indiscriminate offering is made to the public, the
FCC states that it will not regard sharing activity as common car-
riage." 19
The effect of distinguishing resale and sharing activities is to
create an incentive to characterize a service as a sharing arrange-
ment rather than as resale, thus freeing it from the burdens of
regulation. 20 Suppose several sharers pay a management fee to a
nonuser third-party.' 2' The network manager would, in that case,
make a profit on the arrangement just as a reseller would. The
only difference is that the manager's profit cannot include an in-
crease in the cost of the bulk service provided by the underlying
carrier. But this difference will not be significant. The carriers
will surely raise their bulk rates for private line service to reflect
the actual costs of providing them. 22 The major component of
the reseller's profit will then be management compensation-just
as is the user-manager's.
The FCC stated that it will make specific findings in individual
cases in which the status of an offering as resale or sharing is chal-
lenged. 23 The criteria to be used in making this factual determi-
nation will include the duration of the arrangement, the
119. Id at 317. The FCC summarized the three forms of sharing that it anticipated:
(a) sharing through a non-profit intermediary;
(b) "pure" sharing wherein two or more users combine their needs to share only
the costs of communications line service; and
(c) sharing, either through a for-profit intermediary or in an arrangement
wherein one user is the primary user, in which line costs and charges associ-
ated with "'augmented" services are shared according to usage. In this case
no management fee may be charged unless the payment is made to an entity
other than a sharing participant.
Id at 321 (emphasis added). The Commission specifically declined to limit sharing to the
"pure" form. Id at 318. No user may charge a management fee since it is "compensated
for its efforts simply by sharing the cost of its communications requirements." Id at 319.
If a user does charge a management fee, it would then be subject to certification as a com-
mon carrier. Id at 318.
120. Id at 317.
121. The FCC has implied that it will allow this. See text accompanying note 116
.upra.
122. See note 109 supra and accompanying text.
123. 60 F.C.C.2d at 320-21. The FCC emphasized that it reserved the opportunity to
correct abuses: "In the future, if we find that resolution of individual cases regarding im-
proper sharing could be alleviated by reporting, we reserve the right to again consider this
matter." Id at 320.
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advertising used to recruit additional members, and the profit re-
ceived by the sharing entities. 24 It is not clear how closely the
FCC will examine a given sharing arrangement.125 If detailed ex-
aminations are to be made, they will add tremendously to the
FCC's regulatory burden. Undoubtedly, a network manager will
be careful to have the sharing participants sign separate contracts
for service for a specified duration, will not advertise extensively,
and will not be a user of the shared services. If this sort of compli-
ance is all that is required, it will not be difficult to have most
resale relationships characterized as sharing arrangements and
thus avoid regulation.
III. THE COMMUNICATIONS COMMON CARRIER AMENDMENTS
OF 1979: REGULATION WHERE NECESSARY
In June of 1978, legislation was proposed to Congress which
would have totally rewritten the Communications Act of 1934.26
This legislation was in turn substantially modified in March, 1979,
and designated as the Communications Act of 1979.127 Although
the House Subcommittee on Communications decided not to pro-
ceed to the markup stage with the bill, plans are underway to rein-
troduce the common carrier portions of the legislation later in the
96th Congress. 28
This legislation proposes to allow competition to replace much
of the existing federal regulation of communications common car-
riers.'29 It would eliminate the term "common carrier," and re-
124. Id at 319.
125. The FCC thought a strict delineation between resale and sharing unrealistic "in
view of the difficulty in maintaining a clear distinction between these activities." Id at 321.
It stressed that the indicia noted in the text were to be factual questions in every case.
We are not holding that it is impermissible for a sharing arrangement to advertise
for additional members, nor do we set a minimum time commitment that each
user must respect. We simply set forth our view that there are criteria which have
traditionally been looked to in defining common carriage [citing National Ass'n
of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs. v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir. 1976)]. . . . [and]
we will not hesitate to make a factual finding regarding whether the offering is
being made indiscriminately.
Id at 379 (emphasis in original).
126. H.R. 13015, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. H 5128 (daily ed. June 7, 1978).
127. H.R. 3333, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. H 1853 (daily ed. March 29,
1979).
128. The common carrier provisions of H.R. 3333 are section 101, portions of section
102, and sections 311 through 353. Bills have also been introduced in the Senate to modify
the common carrier provisions of the Communications Act along lines similar to those
proposed in the House. See S. 611 and S. 622, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. S
2501 (daily ed. March 12, 1979).
129. Section 101 provides:
COMMON CARRIER REGUL,4TION
place it with the term "carrier,"' 130 and provide for regulation only
of "dominant carriers" as defined in the legislation.131 The FCC
would be required to reexamine its classification of dominant car-
riers and report its findings to Congress at least once every three
years. 132 At the end of ten years, federal regulation of telecommu-
nications would be reduced to a minimum.
133
This proposed legislation, if enacted into law, will radically
change the climate in which telecommunications services are of-
fered. The clear hope of the drafters is that the telecommunica-
(a) The Congress hereby finds that the regulation of interstate and foreign tele-
communications is necessary, to the extent marketplaceforces are deficient, in
order to-
(1) make available to the people of the United States nationwide and
worldwide telecommunications services which are diverse, reliable, and
efficient, and which are universally available at affordable rates; and
(2) meet the needs of United States foreign policy, the national defense and
the safety of life and property.
(b) It is the purpose of this Act to establish certain requirements relating to the
regulation of interstate and foreign telecommunications, which shall apply to
the extent that marketplace forces fail to protect the public interest.
H.R. 3333, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101, 125 CONG. REC. H 1853-54 (daily ed. March 29,
1979) (emphasis added).
Section 31 l(a) provides:
The Congress hereby declares that it is the purpose of this title to assure that the
people of the United States have available, at reasonable rates, domestic and in-
ternational telecommunications services which are reliable, efficient, and diverse,
and to assure that the economy, general welfare, and security of the Nation will
benefit from the continuing improvements in telecommunications technology. In
achieving such purpose, competition and the private sector shall be relied upon to
the maximum extent possible to determine the variety, quality, and cost of tele-
communications services and facilities.
Id. § 31 l(a) (emphasis added).
130. The reason for this change is "to displace the various common law attributes of
common carriage, as well as the historical notions derived under the 1934 Act." STAFF OF
SUBCOMM. ON COMMUNICATIONS OF THE House COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN
COMMERCE, 96TH CONG., IST SEss., H.R. 3333, "THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1979"
SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS 17 (Comm. Print. 1979) [hereinafter cited as STAFF ANAL-
YSIS].
131. A dominant carrier is an interexchange carrier which "(A) furnishes telecommuni-
cations service in a substantial percentage of the total number of markets for interexchange
telecommunications services; and (B) has the ability, in a substantial percentage of those
markets . . . to either raise or lower prices without significantly affecting the amount of
service demanded by its customers. ... H.R. 3333, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 332(b)(1).
Only AT&T would meet this definition today. STAFF ANALYSIS, supra note 130, at 19.
132. Id. § 322(c)(1).
133. After ten years, the FCC's authority to regulate telecommunications carriers
would be limited to certain carriers, to the extent they provide international transmissions
or international telecommunications facilities, which are classified as dominant carriers be-
cause they have "a monopoly over the ownership, control or provision of any category of
international telecommunications facilities" or have "the ability to either raise or lower
prices in a market for a particular type of international transmission without significantly
affecting the amount of service demanded by its customers." Id. §§ 332(d), 332(b)(2).
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tions market will develop during the next ten years so that there
will be no dominant carriers and the market forces of competition
will be activated such that the industry can be completely deregu-
lated.
The Communications Act of 1934 was drafted with a view to-
ward regulating communications in a way which would ensure
that communications services are provided to the public upon rea-
sonable request and at just and reasonable rates. These goals re-
main unchanged today. The proposed amendments would
eliminate regulation which operates to inhibit those goals by
neglecting to take into account the steadying forces of market
competition. They represent Congress' belief that the marketplace
not only is sufficient to ensure fair rates and reasonable profits, but
also is the best source for the promotion of efficient service and
rapid innovation.
